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Abstract
I argue that a household’s interdependent decisions over their children’s
labor and school activities are not only a function of observable “hard
facts” but also of its intrinsic values and beliefs. Applying econometric
methods, after observable factors have been controlled for, the degree
to which these joint decisions over these two activities are correlated
can be seen as the “intrinsic competition” households and children face.
This coeﬃcient of the labor-school trade-oﬀ is not associated with any
observable variables and should therefore be object of future research
in the ﬁeld.
In the empirical study, quite recent and hardly discussed data from
Uganda is used for the joint estimation of child labor and school at-
tendance applying a bivariate probit model. The results shed light on
the degree of the unobserved or “intrinsic competition” between labor
and school attendance. Results implying a stronger trade-oﬀ between
these two decisions in urban than rural areas and stronger for girls
than for boys are obtained. Especially rural boys have a considerably
higher tendency to combine their labor activities with schooling while
the obtained trade-oﬀ implies for girls to specialize. Results seem to
be driven by unobserved cost-related factors, no clear explanation on
this, however, is found.
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11 Introduction
A substantial part of the literature on the determinants of and their eﬀects on
child labor has looked at children’s work time only, assuming that schooling
is the reverse of labor. Researchers, however, have recently begun to consider
children’s schooling decision jointly with the decision over their labor force
participation. The decision over a child’s education is thus not detached
from its labor supply but seen as co–choice. Whereas determinants are
subject to vivid discussions and have been a very well-researched area, the
question of how this household’s decision making process looks like has still
not been fully elaborated. It is usually assumed that children may either go
to school, go to work, or do nothing, however, when accepting that they are
able to divide up their time endowment and allocate it to several diﬀerent
activities, combinations of these binary decisions are possible. But how
do household’s decide upon this? Are these decisions independent of each
other? Is it a sequential decision with the question on whether children’s
income is needed considered before it can be decided upon whether or not
the household can aﬀord school? Or is it of a simultaneous nature with the
“school–labor–idleness” decision being non–hierarchical?
Using a bivariate probit model, this paper examines this issue of inter-
dependence of the joint labor and schooling decision which is assumed to
be of simultaneous nature. Data from Uganda are used to determine the
eﬀects of income, property as well as children’s individual and household
characteristics on their labor–school probabilities.
Special attention is paid to what is not observable and thus not explicitly
entering the econometric model. I argue that the correlation coeﬃcient ρ as
by-product of the bivariate probit model be interpreted as unobservable or
“intrinsic competition” between labor and schooling since it is driven by the
unobserved error term in the joint estimation model. After all explanatory
variables are controlled for, what is left is the degree to which the parents’
decide in favor of labor and against school; or vice versa. This implies
that the more pronounced ρ the higher the trade-oﬀ the parents (in their
decisions) and the children (in their activities) will be facing. The nature of
the underlying joint decision making is discussed in more detailed in section
2, results will be reported in section 5. This study is dedicated to observe
diﬀerences in the competition between the children’s labor activities, special
2emphasis is therefore put on diﬀerences of these eﬀects in rural and urban
households as well as with respect to gender.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the issue of a
joint labor-schooling decision and the econometric methods to be applied;
section 3 reviews the literature and results on the eﬀects of child labor on
school attendance and performance. It also gives a few results on the strand
of literature that examines the trade-oﬀ between labor and school explicitly.
Furthermore, whether or not children specialize in either of the activities
or combine them is discussed. Section 4 gives a few basic properties of the
applied data and discusses the descriptive statistics, emphasizing sub-sample
speciﬁc results on specialization; results for the bivariate probit model are
then reported. Section 5 reports on the evidence on competitive labor–school
decisions and puts the obtained results in relation to existing literature.
Section 6 ﬁnally concludes.
2 Joint time-allocation decision
The decision over a child’s labor force participation and over its school atten-
dance can either be seen as sequential or simultaneous. The former setting
of this decision making process suggests that a household ﬁrst decides over
whether or not it can aﬀord to send its children to school and only thereafter
whether they are sent to work. This explicitly assumes that one of the two
relevant activities has a higher priority to the household; in this example it is
school attendance, whereas for a diﬀerent household the sequential pattern
might be reversed and labor is decided upon prior to school.
Which of these alternative patterns is eventually prevalent depends on
the household’s initial welfare situation as well as its utility ranking with
respect to labor and schooling. Households that assign a high priority to
their children’s education—we assume this to be the case if school atten-
dance is of higher value or utility to the household—may ask the question of
whether school is aﬀordable prior to considering labor as alternative activ-
ity. If, however, a household is budget constrained and its welfare situation
is such that it needs to consider its children’s income contributions before
asking the question of the aﬀordability of schooling, the sequential pattern
is reversed.
3As Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), Maitra and Ray (2002) and oth-
ers argue, a sequential choice is yet not necessarily the case in the labor-
school decision. They rather assume a decision making process without
a hierarchical structure. Thus, households decide simultaneously whether
or not to send their children to work and whether or not to send them to
school. These two decisions can be assumed either to be made independently
or being contingent on each other.
I believe there is no dispute over whether the labor and school decisions,
say x and y, are in any way not dependent on each other, in fact I hypothesize
and ﬁnd evidence that these decisions heavily depend on each other. This
dependence, however, is not perfect in the sense that for instance a one
hour increase in time at work per week decreases school attendance by one
hour per week. Hence, I do not assume that that school is the reverse of
labor as mentioned above and applied in previous studies. I further do not
assume the correlation to be just arbitrary as in the multinomial choice
model (Ashford and Sowden 1970).1
With this in mind a joint estimation techniques seems to be the best
empirical strategy. Zellner and Lee (1965) argue that given some correlation
between two dichotomous dependent variables, joint estimation techniques
yield asymptotically more eﬃcient coeﬃcient estimators than single equation
methods applied to the individual equations in the system.2
Furthermore, the use of the bivariate model (in settings of full observabil-
ity) in recognition of the dependence of two choice “systems” is suggested
by Ashford and Sowden (1970). An example such as that of a drug which,
when applied to a human, may have unanticipated side eﬀects beside its
1Weeks and Orme (1998) discuss the statistical relationship between these two ap-
proaches and provide the appropriate parametric restrictions on the more general multi-
nomial choice models under which the two approaches can be considered equivalent. This
can be the case by recognizing that the two binary decisions generate four mutually ex-
clusive choices. They argue that both this statistical as well as a possible behavioral
relationship between these models have been given too little consideration when applying
them in empirical research. In this paper, too, there will be no statistical discussion of
why the bivariate probit is preferred over the multinomial setting; I rather concentrate on
the behavioral distinction and derive the legitimation of the applied model from there.
2For large samples both approaches will yield the same point estimators. For instance,
referring to the general results in Gouri´ eroux, Monfort, Renault, and Trognon (1987),
Chiappori and Salani´ e (2000) apply both approaches and test for asymmetric information
in insurance markets by computing generalized residuals and rejecting the null hypoth-
esis for zero covariance in the simple probit as well as testing for a non-zero correlation
coeﬃcient ρ in the bivariate probit case.
4intended main eﬀects, can easily be found for the considered labor-school
setting. Lowering the marginal productivity of child labor on a peasant’s
farm by introducing the use of machinery lowers a potential urgent need
of its labor force on the ﬁeld; at the same time the opportunity costs of
schooling decline, thus schooling incentives increase—or rather disincentives
decrease. Also, the formal school system in rural Uganda generates smaller
returns on education than it does in urban areas, implying a smaller diﬀer-
ence between the utility of school participation and non-participation—given
that returns on education positively enter the household’s utility.3 At the
same time, the main source of household income in rural areas comes from
agricultural enterprises. More property of productive assets increases the
marginal productivity (and utility) of children’s labor time, and it does so
to a greater extent in rural than in urban areas. The decisions are thus
correlated through the household’s vicinity.
The two “systems” labor and school individually react to changes in their
environment, observable factors of this environment, however, will only be
one aspect in this paper. We do want to know how certain variables aﬀect
both systems, especially if there is an adverse eﬀect, and section 4.4 will
brieﬂy discuss the eﬀects of commonly used explanatory variables on child
labor and school attendance, yet the explanatory variables of interest are
those that are not observed. Ashford and Sowden (1970) emphasize the
distinction between the bivariate model, which incorporates the dependence
over two binary decisions that generate four mutually exclusive outcomes,
and a single multinomial model which gives four outcomes with some arbi-
trary dependence structure. It is precisely this dependence structure that is
the object of interest because we want to know how the two systems relate
with respect to the unobservable, in a sense how these systems intrinsically
interact.
Assuming simultaneous decision making and interdependence of the two
decisions I will apply a bivariate probit model to jointly estimate a house-
hold’s labor-school decision.4 Underlying this are two binary choice vari-
ables, x and y. In reality, labor-school decisions are not simply yes or no
but are continuous. For a very simpliﬁed illustration, let x represent the
3See (Gotschi 2004) for a detailed account of education and relevant policies in Uganda.
4See the standard literature such as Long (1997) or Greene (2003) for the technical
details.
5decision over a child’s labor force participation with a choice set X ≡ [0,e),
where e is the child’s time endowment5; analogously, for the school decision
y the choice set is given by Y ≡ [0,e). It is obvious that x + y ≤ e. Let’s
further assume that the household’s welfare is a function of its “environ-
ment” Ω and the time-allocation combination (x,y) over which the utility
is maximized, max
(x,y)∈X×Y
u(Ω,(x,y)) subject to x + y ≤ e.
For this study, however, we only consider binary choice decisions x and
y. Let X ≡ {0,1}, where x = 1 if the child works and x = 0 otherwise;
analogously, for the schooling choice y ∈ Y ≡ {0,1} we observe y = 1 if the
child attends school and y = 0 otherwise. These two decisions generate four
mutually exclusive outcomes: X×Y → (x,y) ∈ {(1,1),(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)}.
Again, households maximize u(Ω,(x,y)) over these decision combinations.
Decisions over x and y are assumed to be made simultaneously. The
household’s labor decision, for instance, is based on the respective labor or
no labor utilities given the school decision y, u(Ω,(1,y)) and u(Ω,(0,y)).
The comparison of these two decision outcomes yields
ux (Ω,(x,y)) = u(Ω,(1,y)) − u(Ω,(0,y)). (1)
The same is assumed for the school decision given x,
uy (Ω,(x,y)) = u(Ω,(x,1)) − u(Ω,(x,0)). (2)
If ux (Ω,(x,y)) > 0 and uy (Ω,(x,y)) > 0 this decision structure implies
that the child will both work and attend school; if ux (Ω,(x,y)) > 0 and
uy (Ω,(x,y)) < 0, howver, the child will work but not attend school. Anal-
ogously, this probability of (x,y) = (1,0) can simply be characterized by
π(1,0) = Prob[ux (Ω,(x,y)) > 0 ∧ uy (Ω,(x,y)) < 0].6
5Not included is time spent at sleep, eating, leisure, and similar activities.
6The same choice structure can be achieved by a single decision with these four choices.
Weeks and Orme (1998) impose restrictions on this single decision multinomial choice
model under which the methods are equivalent with respect to their utility maximization.
63 Labor and schooling trade-oﬀ in the literature -
Some ﬁndings
The determinants of child labor have been a very well researched ﬁeld and
there is a number of thorough and insightful surveys on the central results.7
There is also an extensive literature on the eﬀects of child labor on school
attendance and school performance; a few articles have explicitly raised the
issue of a trade-oﬀ between labor and school. This section will highlight only
a selective portion of the existing literature. For a more detailed discussion
with respect to eﬀects of the determinants of child labor and schooling and
vice versa see the listed survey literature.
Quite a bit has been written on the eﬀects of children’s labor force par-
ticipation on their school attendance and to what extent labor hampers edu-
cation. While for instance Jensen and Nielsen (1997) assume that schooling
is just the reverse of labor, many recent studies such as Cockburn (2001),
Maitra and Ray (2002), or Ersado (2005) have made explicit use of the obser-
vation that children tend to combine school and labor. Also, Boozer and Suri
(2001) ﬁnd that a one hour increase of child labor leads to a 0.38 hour de-
crease in schooling, a result qualitatively supported by Ravallion and Wodon
(1999).8 Heady (2003), however, derives slightly diﬀerent results for Ghana
and concludes that child labor does not aﬀect school attendance but sub-
stantially interferes with the quality of schooling with respect to children’s
reading and mathematics abilities. A similar result is obtained by Parikh
and Sadoulet (2005) who argue that child and school are “not necessarily
incompatible” but understand that due to children’s “dual commitment” at
work and in school their education progress may be impaired.9
The issue of to what extent school performance is aﬀected by child labor
has further been examined by Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995) who con-
clude for Paraguayan data that children can both attend school and work
without evident eﬀect on their schooling progress. It appears that child labor
does not interfere with school work when looking at whether or not children
7A comprehensive book was edited by Grootaert and Patrinos (1999), recent articles
with in-depth literature surveys are Basu and Tzannatos (2003), Bhalotra and Tzannatos
(2003), Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern (2003), or Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2004).
8See also Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) for evidence on the enrollment reducing eﬀect
of strong child labor markets.
9See Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sanchez (2006) for a more detailed summary of existing
literature.
7have to repeat grades. In a later paper (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997)
on Zambia they ﬁnd that child labor signiﬁcantly predicts children’s “age
grade distortions”, hence hampers the schooling progress.
In a study on Tanzania, Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999) conclude
that children’s reading competence decreases with child labor hours. They
ﬁnd, for instance, that the probability of a girl being able to read a news-
paper increases by eight percentage points as result of a one hour reduction
of work. This results from both an increased time of study and a higher
probability of school attendance. These ﬁndings are in line with Ray and
Lancaster (2004) whose results give evidence for a negative impact of child
labor on school outcomes which they ﬁnd to be more detrimental for girls
than for boys. Gunnarsson, Orazem, and Sanchez (2006) using a rich data
set including data from eleven developing countries ﬁnd that child labor
signiﬁcantly reduces test scores in every country.
Apart from the literature on the potentially negative eﬀect of labor on
school attendance and performance, yielding mixed evidence, there has been
quite a vivid strand of literature on the question to what extent children tend
to specialize in either one of the two activities.10
A positive eﬀect of the number of children in the household on the levels
of education of each individual child is observed by Chernichovsky (1985).
He argues in favor of a notion of specialization due to possible diminishing
returns to labor in a household for a given amount of assets. This reduces
the (indirect) opportunity costs of schooling, potentially leading to a role
assignment, with some children emphasizing on school and others on la-
bor. Applying a multinomial logit model to data from Peru, Pakistan and
Ghana, Maitra and Ray (2002) obtain results on the degree of labor-school
specialization. They ﬁnd a strong gender-role since girls are more likely
than boys to specialize in either labor or school or do neither, whereas gen-
erally older children are more likely to be able to combine schooling with
employment. Concerning a household’s poverty status, a clear picture is
obtained for Pakistani households where children tend to withdraw from a
10Only a few articles are known to the author that do not only ﬁnd ambiguous results
but explicitly doubt the notion of “bad child labor” that harms a child’s educational
attainment and prevents an escape from poverty. Rodgers and Standing (1981, p. 33) for
instance write that “work itself may be an important component of ‘education’, especially
in household-based production systems”, Scoville (2002) calls for a model incorporating
the “beneﬁts” of child labor, and Ray and Lancaster (2004) refer to non-formal education
out of the formal school system and put school-impairing child labor in a new perspective.
8labor–school combination into specialization in labor or idleness when the
household falls into poverty. Additionally, higher education of adult females
in Ghanaian households increases the probability of a child moving from
labor or idleness into the labor–school combination, thus having a positive
eﬀect on school attendance.
Are labor and schooling complements or is there a tradeoﬀ that drives
children into specializing? Nielsen (1998, p. ) interprets her signiﬁcantly
negative correlation coeﬃcient as a negative relationship between attending
labor and school, that means “some unobserved factors that increase the
probability of attending school decrease the probability of working.” While
she does not further discuss this trade-oﬀ, Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos
(1999) explicitly examine it and conclude that there is indeed a trade-oﬀ
between child labor and school performance. In a study on 1998 Brazilian
data Muniz (2001) ﬁnds a strong trade-oﬀ between school attendance and
waged labor. The decisions of whether to send a child to school or non-
waged work, however, are not interdependent. In a very recent study on
1992 Brazilian data Parikh and Sadoulet (2005) argue that since child work
is responsive to opportunities of work, school attendance and labor are not
necessarily incompatible, concluding there to be no real trade-oﬀ. Referring
to Heady (2003) they do, however, understand that child labor may impair
the quality of school due to children’s “dual commitment.”
Thus, Parikh and Sadoulet (2005) may not speak of a trade-oﬀ per se
between school attendance and work, but assuming that parents anticipate
the detrimental eﬀect of their children’s work time on their education, there
is still a trade-oﬀ between the quality of school and child labor, which is
reﬂected in the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient ρ for both the urban and the rural
sub-sample.
A last remark is to be made on the choice of bivariate probit over multino-
mial logit. Maitra and Ray (2002) brieﬂy discuss joint estimation techniques
that have been applied in the literature that recognizes the interdependence
and simultaneity of the decisions over children’s schooling and labor. They
argue that the bivariate approach does recognize the decisions’ interdepen-
dency but does not consider all the possibilities. They prefer the multinomial
approach over the bivariate model because it seems that the estimation of
one equation “is more easily understood.” By doing so, however, they are not
able to test whether there is in fact unobserved interdependency between the
9two decision systems. In a two-step approach Bacolod and Ranjan (2005)
ﬁrst test for this unobserved correlation between labor and schooling and
obtain a correlation coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
They therefore conclude the multinomial model to be the proper technique
in this case.
4 Bivariate probit estimations for Uganda
This section brieﬂy describes the data source and gives basic descriptive
statistics with an emphasis on the combination vs. specialization question.
I later discuss the speciﬁcation of the bivariate probit estimations and ﬁnally
give results of the eﬀects of the determinants of child labor and schooling.
Section 5 then discusses the results on unobservable or “intrinsic competi-
tion.”
4.1 The data source
I use recent data from the Uganda National Household Survey 1999/2000
(UBOS 1999) collected over a time span of twelve months in 41 districts of
Uganda. The clustered sample consists of roughly 15,500 children aged six
to 15 in rural and 3,600 in urban households. Out of these, 49.2 percent are
girls, 50.8 percent are boys.
The survey asks for the children’s usual main and secondary activity
(within the last 12 months) as well as their current main activity (within
the last seven days). This gives suﬃcient data for the construction of la-
bor and schooling indicators (x,y) that are to be applied in the empirical
investigations hereafter.11
The empirical literature has come up with various diﬀerent ways of con-
struction of the variables of interest when parents are only indirectly asked
about the child labor status of their children. In order to obtain child labor
policy compatible results, any indicators need to comply with internationally
used standards and deﬁnitions12, however, authors are usually constrained
by the availability of the data. In general, Nielsen (1998) makes a strong
11See Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999, p. 121) for criticism of survey that do
collect data on main activity only.
12ILO Conventions 138 and 182 (OECD 2003) deﬁnes child labor as “a) all economic
activity done by children until age 11; b) all economic activity done by children aged 12 to
14 excluding ‘light work’ in the sense of Convention 138; c) all economic activity carried
10Table 1: Dependent variables
Dependent sub–samples
variables full rural urban girls boys
labor 0.101 0.114 0.046 0.079 0.122
labor incl. chores 0.192 0.197 0.167 0.197 0.186
schooling 0.890 0.887 0.923 0.883 0.897
Observations 19,325 15,658 3,667 9,518 9,807
Simple mean of labor and schooling given for the sub–samples.
case for a short–run child variable due to a potential “memory eﬀect” if the
long–run twelve months time span were used; Blunch and Verner (2000) for
instance stress the question of whether or not child labor jeopardizes chil-
dren’s school attendance and deﬁne a child being at work only if it does not
attend school as a potential secondary activity. Sakellariou and Lall (2000)
among others ﬁnally suggest a child to be regarded as “economically active”
if working a positive amount of time, which is in close accordance with ILO
standards.
For the joint estimation of child labor and schooling I construct the fol-
lowing for child labor: The binary choice variable x is equal to unity if the
child is reported being economically active13 either as main or secondary
usual activity, zero otherwise. This allows for the consideration of child la-
bor which is not perceived as a high priority activity of the child, i.e. also
incorporates children that may go to school as their primary activity but
have to work in their out–of–school time. In accordance with ILO stan-
dards, household chores are not associated with the notion of child labor
and therefore not taken into account.
The school attendance variable is constructed in a similar manner. If
either the primary or the secondary usual activity is “attending school”, the
variable y is equal to unity, zero otherwise. As with the child labor indicator
x, if no secondary usual activity is reported—which is the case in roughly 35
percent of the observations—the primary entry is regarded the only activity
the child is pursuing.
Table 1 gives the incidence of reported child labor (both the aforemen-
tioned variable and, for reference, child labor including chores, based on
out under hazardous conditions by children aged 15 to 17, and d) ‘the worst forms’ of child
labour carried out under age 18.”.
13Economic activity in this context means “own account work”, “unpaid family work”,
“private employment”, or “unemployment”, as dictated by the data.
11children’s current activity) and schooling for the full sample of children as
well as for girls/boys and children from rural/urban households. Not much
diﬀerence is observed in boys’ and girls’ schooling, whereas boys work sub-
stantially more than girls when household chores are not accounted for.
When chores are taken into consideration girls exhibit a higher incidence of
work than boys do. Controlling for intra–household activities can therefore
substantially inﬂuence results and implications of an empirical exercise. The
diﬀerences in school attendance of children from rural and urban households
are not very pronounced. School attendance is by about four percentage
points higher in urban than in rural households. Urban children, however,
exhibit a much lower incidence of child labor than rural kids. These obser-
vations call for looking at these sub-samples in separate estimations.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the indi-
vidual decisions over child labor and schooling are correlated and how their
determinants diﬀer for various sub–samples. Table 2 tabulates school at-
tendance in percent conditioned upon children’s labor force participation;
columns 2 and 3 give the school attendance rates for non-working children,
columns 4 and 5 do so for working children, column 6 gives the share of
children both attending school and working over the full sub–sample. The
observable fact that if a child works its school attendance is substantially
lower compared to the unconditional ﬁgures in table 1 implies a negative
correlation between labor and schooling—a simple correlation coeﬃcient of
−0.2226 is obtained. Looking at the simple descriptive ﬁgures for the given
sub–samples, two central observations can be made:
First, whereas unconditional schooling of urban is higher than of rural
children, that is school attendance is relatively higher in urban households,
children from rural households are more likely to combine schooling and
labor. While roughly 70 percent of working rural children also go to school,
only about 52 percent of urban children do so (column 5). Overall, only 2.4
percent of urban children both work and go school while 7.9 percent do so in
rural areas (column 6). On the other hand the extent of idle children is also
12Table 2: School attendance and child labor
Sub–sample no labor & no labor & labor & labor & both
no school school no school school (uncond.)
full 8.63 91.37 31.71 68.29 6.90
rural 9.36 90.64 30.19 69.81 7.94
urban 5.75 94.25 47.65 52.35 2.43
girls 9.09 90.91 41.63 58.37 4.65
boys 8.17 91.83 25.40 74.60 9.08
rural girls 9.66 90.34 39.18 60.82 5.43
urban girls 6.85 93.15 64.00 36.00 1.45
rural boys 9.06 90.94 24.59 75.41 10.36
urban boys 4.60 95.40 34.74 65.26 3.42
Numbers in percent; school attendance rates are conditional on labor; columns 2 & 3 as well
as 4 & 5 add up to 100%. Column 6 gives percentage of “combining children”, i.e. children
that both work and go to school.
higher in rural households (8.3 percent compared to 5.5 percent)14 implying
a smaller extent of a specialization in either school or labor.
Second, a similar pattern is observed with respect to gender sub–samples.
Working girls exhibit substantially lower degrees of school attendance (58.4
percent) than working boys (74.6 percent); only 4.6 percent of all girls can
combine schooling and labor whereas this is done by roughly 9 percent of
the boys in the sample. Consequently, the share of children combining both
labor and school is lowest when looking at urban girls (1.5 percent) and
highest when considering the rural boys sub–sample (10.4 percent).15 As
already mentioned by Maitra and Ray (2002) girls tend to specialize in
either labor or school, an observation also found in Uganda.
There may be diﬀerent reasons for this pattern: It could be assumed
that boys’ duties are less time consuming and therefore more time is left
for schooling activities. There is, however, no convincing reason for this;
it seems rather more plausible to assume that since in general (under the
applied labor indicator) boys are more likely to work than girls the inci-
dence of a combination of these activities is higher for boys because at the
same time their school attendance is given higher priority than the girls’.
14See Biggeri, Guarcello, Lyon, and Rosati (2003) for a detailed discussion on children
that neither attend school nor work, or Bacolod and Ranjan (2005) for a theoretical
model and empirical account using data from the Philippines. See also table (3) and the
subsequent discussion of reasons not attending school.
15Out of rural boys, 13.7 percent work, whereas only 8.9 percent of rural girls are
economically active. The ﬁgures for urban boys are 5.3 percent and 4 percent for urban
girls.
13Table 3: Reasons for never attending school
Sub–samples
full rural urban girls boys
too young 57.84 58.87 48.24 57.96 57.65
indiﬀerent 14.97 15.84 7.06 14.52 15.42
need to work 3.23 3.39 1.76 3.72 2.73
costs 10.39 8.60 26.47 12.08 8.66
others 13.57 13.30 16.47 11.72 15.54
observations 1,704 1,534 170 861 843
Figures are in percent of the number of observations.
This is especially the case when the decision over schooling depends on the
associated costs.
Table 3 gives reported reasons for children never having attended school.
For the 861 girls out of the entire sample that have never attended school, 12
percent did not do so because of high costs whereas this was the reason for
only 8.7 percent of the boys’ sub–sample. Parents are not as willing to make
sacriﬁces for the sake of girls’ school attendance as they are for boys’, whose
education thus implicitly exhibits higher priority. This line of argument is
especially applicable in urban households suggested by the ﬁgures in table 3:
more than 26 percent of urban children never having attended school give
high costs as the main reason.16
Costs, however, may have two diﬀerent facets. Direct costs of schooling,
such materials and school uniforms17, seem to be the most obvious, yet costs
are also associated with opportunity costs of schooling. With this respect,
Cain (1977) distinguishes between opportunity costs accruing from two dif-
ferent natures of child labor: (directly) productive labor that produces a
positive output per se, and “enabling” child labor suggesting that if children
take over household chores or activities that are usually performed by their
mothers (or also fathers), these are then freed from those and can pursue
(directly) productive activities.18 Hence, if the opportunity costs (foregone
16Notice that empirical ﬁndings do not necessarily reﬂect these descriptive statistics: for
Zambian data, Nielsen (1998) obtains surprising results concerning the eﬀects of school
expenditures on child labor and schooling. There, the decisions are only “moderately
sensitive” to changes in these variables.
17In 1997, Uganda declared a policy of Universal Primary Education (UPE) that waives
school tuition and textbook fees for up to four children of primary-school age (6 to 12)
per family. (USDoL 2002)
18See also Levison (1991).
14income of, for instance, the mother) of children’s school attendance exceed
a certain acceptable level, no schooling takes place.
As opposed to direct costs of schooling, in table (3) opportunity costs
are most likely not captured by costs but by the children’s need to work as
has become clear by the reasoning above. This need to work as reason for
no schooling at all plays a greater role in rural households than in urban,
which is exactly the reverse pattern to direct costs that played a greater role
in urban households. Since agricultural income has a much greater impact
in rural than in urban areas19 we can conclude that the need to work is
partially associated with a household’s income source and that opportunity
costs are higher in households with a farming or other agricultural business.
The given ﬁgures shed some light on why children do not attend school
and how this decision interacts with their labor force participation. Speciﬁc
data on direct or indirect school costs are not given, neither is informa-
tion on the priority assigned to education by the parents. However, proxies
can be found to capture it. The eﬀects of (direct) schooling costs are ex-
pected to be controlled for by a household’s income situation (through con-
strained household expenditures), (direct) opportunity costs as induced by
directly productive activities can be argued to be proxied by the property of
time–intensive productive assets such as land or livestock (Canagarajah and
Coulombe 1997, Jensen and Nielsen 1997, and others); opportunity costs
that are associated with “enabling” child labor are proxied using household
structure variables such as the number of infant siblings that are to be taken
care of. The more housework a child can perform in lieu of its parents, the
higher the opportunity costs of schooling will be.
Further, parents’ education is not only assumed to explain their income
potential but may also serve as proxy variable for their indiﬀerence with
respect to schooling. The average educational attainment of fathers and
mothers is 5.4 and 3.5 years, respectively. For the children never having
attended school it is 3.4 and 1.7, respectively; for the children that have
never attended school due to their parents’ indiﬀerence it is a at a low 0.75
and 0.30. The low educational level of “indiﬀerent” parents can thus serve
19Almost 97 percent of children in rural areas live in households that report some source
of agricultural income, whereas only 21 percent do so in households that report employ-
ment or wage income sources.
15Table 4: Deﬁnitions of variables
Variable Description
Dependent variables
labor 1, if the child’s primary or secondary usual activity is work (12 months)
schooling 1, if child’s primary or secondary usual activity is school (12 months)
Individual characteristics Ri
sex 1, if a boy; 0 otherwise
age child’s age in years
age2 age squared
ownchild 1, if child is household’s heads natural/own child; 0 otherwise
Household characteristics Rh
income household heads’ total employment income per adult equivalent, total of
last twelve months
income2 income squared
education father educational attainment of father, in years
education mother educational attainment of mother, in years
land previous year’s land property, in acres per adult equivalent
land2 land squared
cattle previous year’s cattle property per adult equivalent, in pieces
cattle2 cattle squared
urban 1, if household is situated in urban neighborhood; 0 otherwise
female head 1, if household head is a woman; 0 otherwise
farming 1, if household owns a crop raising enterprise; 0 otherwise
bicycle 1, if household owns one or more bicycles; 0 otherwise
under 5 number of children aged 5 years or younger in the household
under 10 number of children aged 10 or younger in the household
adults number of adults (aged 16 or older) in the household
childratio children–adult ratio in the household
girlratio share of girls in the household
Dummy variables indicating household’s district and month of interview
Source: Socio–Economic Survey Questionnaire (UBOS 1999).
as an additional determinant of the school attendance decision and will be
used for sub-sample speciﬁc model speciﬁcations.20
4.3 Speciﬁcation
A bivariate probit model is applied to estimate the school attendance and
working behavior in a reduced form model, focusing on a combination of
demand and supply side variables. Due to the fact that especially in rural
areas of Uganda agricultural activities are the main “source” of child la-
bor, dummy variables indicating the month of the household’s interview are
included to control for the demand side (harvest time!). Further, acknowl-
edging that most children work on a family’s farm, productive household
20For detailed descriptive statistics on income or education variables as well as household
characteristics see Mwebaze (2004) and Ganglmair (2005).
16assets can be assumed to comprise another crucial source of labor demand
(i.e. the household’s own demand).21
The labor and schooling decisions as denoted by equations (3) and (4)
are functions of individual characteristics Ri and household characteristics
Rh, where R = Ri∪Rh. Table 4 brieﬂy describes the applied variables. The
coeﬃcient vector βl,i contains the coeﬃcients of the individual characteristics
for the labor equation, βs,i the ones for the schooling equation, where l = x
and y = s; analogously for the household characteristics.
Prob[ul (Ω,(l,s)) > 0] = Φ[Riβl,i + Rhβl,h + εl] (3)
Prob[us (Ω,(l,s)) > 0] = Φ[Riβs,i + Rhβs,h + εs]. (4)
As before, Prob[ul (Ω,(l,s)) > 0] denotes the probability that the utility of
the simple labor decision is positive, analogously for schooling s, where Φ is
the standardized cumulative distribution function with error terms εl and εs
for labor and school, respectively. These two decisions are jointly estimated
by bivariate probit and marginal eﬀects are reported. An underlying as-
sumption of the bivariate probit model is the joint distribution of the error















where ρ = cov (εl,εs).
For the null of ρ = 0 the `-ratio test statistic is reported.
I estimate two diﬀerent models, because I want to determine both the
eﬀects of household’s employment income net of children’s contributions
(“poverty explanation”) and parents’ educational levels. It can be expected
that the education variables will be capturing a substantial part of the in-
come eﬀect due to high correlation between these variables22, however, using
both sets allows us to separately look at fathers’ and mothers’ education ef-
fects on labor–school decisions. The marginal eﬀects of parents’ educational
attainment are reported in table 7 where only the income variables in the
21The (structural) demand and supply equations for the individual decisions are assumed
to depend on possibly non–identical sets of regressors. The nature of the applied data,
however, does not allow for a full speciﬁcation of the child labor demand equation since no
detailed market and employer data are available. Reduced form equations—the analogous
is true for the school equation—are therefore applied.
22A simple OLS regression with household heads’ income as dependent variable and
mother’s education, fathers’ education, district and monthly dummy variables yields pos-
itive marginal eﬀects for the education variables (signiﬁcant at the 1% level) with an R
2
of 0.12.
17speciﬁcation used for tables 5 and 6 are replaced by the educational attain-
ment variables.
4.4 Empirical results
This section gives the basic results for determinants of child labor and school-
ing from the joint labor–school estimation using the speciﬁcation given in
equations (3) and (4). There has been little empirical research on child labor
in Uganda, in fact there are only three studies known to the author that
did so, however, used older data (Angemi 2002, using data from a survey
from 1992) or applied a single estimation approach (Mwebaze 2004, apply-
ing probit on older and recent data).23 Empirical results on the eﬀects of in
general very well researched determinants of child labor shall therefore be
brieﬂy presented—without major deviations from the established literature.
Section 5 will eventually focus on the trade-oﬀ between labor and school.
Tables 5 and 6 give results for the speciﬁcations using households’ em-
ployment income for diﬀerent sub–samples, table 7 gives the marginal eﬀects
of parents’ education attainment.
Individual characteristics and household structure: As already sug-
gested in section 4.2, boys have higher probabilities of labor and school in
both urban and rural households, as is seen in table 5. Age also plays a
dominant role, where older children have higher probabilities of both labor
and school in rural households. For urban households a positive, diminishing
eﬀect on the school decision can be observed, while the point estimate for
the labor equation yields a negative, virtually linear marginal eﬀect (p-value:
0.104).
The household’s structure seems to be more relevant for girls’ decisions
than boys’ (table 6). The number of siblings aged ﬁve or younger decreases
girls’ schooling, but does not aﬀect their labor decisions. As was indicated
earlier this may be due to the opportunity costs of schooling that increase
with house work load. On the other hand, younger siblings drive boys into
the labor force. Siblings between six and ten increase girls’ schooling but
again do neither aﬀect their labor force participation nor do they have a
signiﬁcant impact on the decision over boys’ activities. This increase of
schooling can be thought of arising from a loosened labor force constraint
23See also Ganglmair (2005) on probit results for the determinants of child labor using
these data.
18Table 5: Results for rural and urban sub–samples
Rural Urban






[7.4471] [2.4294] [2.2457] [1.9167]
age 10.187 0.0213
∗∗ 0.1850
∗∗ 10.335 -0.0025 0.0776
∗∗
[3.3437] [28.839] [1.6274] [8.8147]
age




[0.7293] [27.564] [2.9940] [9.0270]




[0.7189] [3.1930] [3.8520] [8.0722]
income 0.0285 -0.0118 0.1044
∗∗ 0.1846 -0.0010 0.0150
[0.3289] [3.2589] [0.4594] [1.1947]
income
2 0.0127 0.0017 -0.0396
∗∗ 0.2481 0.0001 -0.0005
[0.1430] [2.7716] [0.5699] [0.5098]
female head 0.2280 0.0137
† 0.0110 0.3016 -0.0007 0.0093
[1.9218] [1.5677] [0.4325] [1.2101]
farming 0.9667 0.0233 0.0183 0.4687 0.0063
∗∗ 0.0130
†
[1.5857] [1.0100] [4.1839] [1.8018]
bicycle 0.5596 -0.0107
† 0.0335
∗∗ 0.3998 -0.0011 0.0053
[1.8136] [5.6879] [0.7879] [0.7201]
land 0.8318 0.0012 0.0098
∗∗ 0.5576 -0.0002 0.0032
[0.3376] [3.3788] [0.5288] [0.9149]
land
2 4.9601 -0.0003 -0.0002
∗∗ 8.1187 0.0000 0.0000
[1.4357] [4.0025] [0.1480] [1.2630]
cattle 0.3514 0.0189
∗∗ 0.0002 0.2104 -0.0001 0.0029




† 1.0253 0.0000 -0.0002
[3.4354] [1.8881] [0.5564] [0.6809]
under 5 1.3707 0.0021 -0.0015 1.0733 0.0015
∗ -0.0071
[0.7726] [0.5322] [2.3861] [1.5840]
under 10 1.9312 0.0001 0.0022 1.9614 0.0007 0.0030
[0.0474] [0.6549] [1.1761] [0.8145]
adults 3.0407 -0.0019 0.0027 3.3653 -0.0009
∗ 0.0076
∗∗
[0.7760] [1.1349] [2.0710] [2.6829]
childratio 0.6160 -0.0084 0.0272 0.5958 -0.0070 0.0163
[0.2628] [0.8242] [1.0956] [0.4130]
girlratio 0.4890 -0.0176
∗ 0.0137 0.5059 -0.0004 0.0054
[2.0057] [1.5289] [0.1491] [0.4360]
Results for regional and monthly dummy variables are suppressed
Pred. prob. 0.0641 0.9243 0.0039 0.9611
log pseudo–` -8354.11 -1257.53
ρ -0.6205 -0.7758
χ
2 (`-ratio test for ρ = 0) 381.42 129.61
# of obs. 15642 3657
# of clusters 611 118
Marginal eﬀects reported for bivariate probit estimations. Robust z statistics in brackets,
standard errors control for cluster design; signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗ : 1%; ∗ : 5%; † : 10%.
Extreme values are dropped from the sample.
19for girls, which means that mid-aged children are more likely to take over
their sisters’ rather than their brothers’ activities. With this respect boys
and girls are “competing” over mid-aged siblings to take over their duties.24
The number of adults in the household increases school attendance prob-
abilities for girls and boys (p-value: 0.109) and generally children in urban
households. Loosening a household’s labor resource constraint yields posi-
tive eﬀects on children’s schooling only in urban households. It does so, how-
ever, not in rural households as can be seen from the insigniﬁcant marginal
eﬀect of adults on school and labor in the rural sub–sample. This sug-
gests that children’s labor force does not necessarily serve as a substitute
for adults’.
The share of children over all household members has virtually zero ef-
fects on both school and labor in the reported sub–samples. In rural house-
holds and for girls, the share of girls relative to all children has signiﬁcant
eﬀects on both school and labor. The higher the share of girls, the more
likely children as well as girls are to attend school and the less likely they are
to work. For urban children as well as for boys no such eﬀect is observable.
Girls thus do not substitute for boys in their labor activities, suggesting a
gender–speciﬁc “role order” in a household’s assignment of child labor and
school attendance.
Household income and property: It is further interesting to observe
that none but one of the variables capturing income and asset property has
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on either schooling or labor in the urban sub–sample.
The farming indicator positively aﬀects both decisions implying some en-
tanglement of income and productivity eﬀects that are labor–reducing and
labor–increasing, respectively.25
In rural households, income positively aﬀects the decision over school
but has no signiﬁcant impact on child labor. This possibly captures school
costs that are more constraining in rural than in urban areas whose binding
eﬀect is alleviated when income increases. Similar eﬀects on school only are
obtained for land property whereas a household’s property of cattle signif-
icantly increases labor only, as seen in Cockburn (2001) for small animals.
Cattle thus seems to exhibit some sort of productivity eﬀect that is labor–
24For a thorough analysis of sibling composition and child labor see for instance Ed-
monds (2006).
25See Ganglmair (2005) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
20Table 6: Results for girls and boys sub–samples
Girls Boys






[4.0615] [3.6381] [4.3431] [3.3923]








∗∗ 112.80 -0.0003 -0.0068
∗∗
[3.4932] [21.553] [0.8817] [20.360]
ownchild 0.7391 -0.0129
∗∗ 0.0480
∗∗ 0.7574 -0.0030 0.0135
∗
[2.9203] [6.5286] [0.4660] [2.0457]
income 0.0625 0.0251 -0.0090 0.0537 -0.0838
∗ 0.2052
∗∗
[1.1524] [0.4123] [2.4359] [6.0288]
income
2 0.0774 -0.0060 0.0038 0.0378 0.0227
∗ -0.0609
∗∗
[0.4581] [1.2172] [2.0136] [4.8466]
female head 0.2464 0.0024 0.0179
∗ 0.2377 0.0183
∗ 0.0017





[3.1020] [2.3385] [3.5823] [0.9838]
bicycle 0.5286 -0.0137
∗∗ 0.0384
∗∗ 0.5301 -0.0009 0.0199
∗∗
[2.9125] [6.0178] [0.1489] [2.9927]
land 0.7544 0.0073 0.0159
∗∗ 0.8045 -0.0012 0.0043




∗∗ 6.7136 -0.0001 -0.0001
†
[1.8102] [3.7268] [0.4942] [1.9361]
cattle 0.3185 0.0029 0.0044 0.3308 0.0280
∗∗ -0.0048
[1.1913] [0.7737] [6.0351] [1.3182]
cattle
2 1.3931 -0.0001 -0.0006
∗ 1.4188 -0.0013
∗∗ -0.0001
[0.4832] [2.1765] [3.7774] [0.3943]
under 5 1.3250 0.0004 -0.0059
† 1.3040 0.0053 -0.0015
[0.1998] [1.7468] [1.5707] [0.5005]
under 10 1.9428 0.0006 0.0086
∗ 1.9311 0.0003 -0.0014
[0.2234] [2.5258] [0.0896] [0.4316]
adults 3.0844 -0.0025 0.0071
∗ 3.1194 -0.0021 0.0042
[1.2415] [2.4398] [0.8961] [1.6008]
childratio 0.6130 0.0056 0.0071 0.6113 -0.0280 0.0519
[0.1984] [0.1863] [0.8000] [1.3838]
girlratio 0.6822 -0.0151
† 0.0301
∗ 0.3081 -0.0145 0.0116
[1.7730] [2.5520] [1.1107] [0.9653]
Results for regional and monthly dummy variables are suppressed
Pred. prob. 0.0359 0.9273 0.0658 0.9350
log pseudo–` -4459.16 -5193.43
ρ -0.7117 -0.5961
χ
2 (`-ratio test for ρ = 0) 349.65 261.94
# of obs. 9499 9800
# of clusters 669 671
Marginal eﬀects reported for bivariate probit estimations. Robust z statistics in brackets,
standard errors control for cluster design; signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗ : 1%; ∗ : 5%; † : 10%.
Extreme values are dropped from the sample.
21increasing and as with land does not increase opportunity costs of schooling,
as was suggested in an earlier section. It rather seems that the positive eﬀect
of the income obtained from these agricultural assets compensated for the
negative eﬀect on schooling associated with opportunity costs.
A similar picture for agricultural assets is obtained for the girls and boys
sub-samples. Land has a stronger eﬀect on the former and cattle on the latter
implying a possible gender role eﬀect in (agricultural) households.26 Only
cattle negatively aﬀects boys’ schooling; more property of livestock increases
the opportunity costs of schooling beyond the additional agricultural income.
Table 7 gives the marginal eﬀects of parental education for all four sam-
ples. There are three central observations to make: The eﬀects of parents’
education on both labor and schooling are more pronounced in rural than
urban households. Further, mothers’ educational attainment has relatively
and absolutely stronger marginal eﬀects on the two decisions than fathers’
education, which is also observed for example by Duraisamy (2000) in a
study using data from rural India. Third, the eﬀect on the school decision is
stronger for girls than for boys, however, the latter react more sensitively to
parents’ education in their labor decisions. It is girls’ schooling and boys’ la-
bor that react to parents’ education rather than vice versa. These results are
in general in line with those by Cockburn (2001) and Emerson and Portela
(2001) who observe a similar pattern, while the ﬁndings of Pal (2003) are
even more pronounced.
5 Labor-school trade-oﬀ and intrinsic competition
The aim of this study is to examine the trade-oﬀ between labor and school-
ing, and it is intended to shed light on the degree of “competition” between
these two systems in a household’s utility maximization. For such, a house-
hold bases its decision upon its perceived environment Ω and will choose
x = l and y = s such that its overall utility is maximized. The household
has its individual, private knowledge over the observable environment and
its intrinsic values, the researcher, however, only gets a rough picture of
the environment and can at best proxy intrinsic values. Consequentially,
26See for instance Mueller (1984) for an early or Cockburn (2001) and Bhalotra and
Heady (2003) for a detailed recent discussion of child labor and a household’s property of
agricultural assets.
22Table 7: Eﬀects of parents’ education
Rural Urban
Variable Mean labor school Mean labor school





[1.7333] [8.2833] [2.6428] [2.8847]





[2.5996] [9.8168] [4.0486] [6.4428]
other variables suppressed
Pred. prob. 0.0634 0.9316 0.0032 0.9603
log pseudo–` -8206.28 -1190.92
ρ -0.6135 -0.7569
χ
2 (`-ratio test for ρ = 0) 360.31 123.65
Girls Boys
Variable Mean labor school Mean labor school





[2.4291] [8.5840] [2.0371] [6.1173]





[2.9924] [10.680] [3.4090] [6.9131]
other variables suppressed
Pred. prob. 0.0349 0.9395 0.0650 0.9393
log pseudo–` -4301.77 -5122.81
ρ -0.7106 -0.5858
χ
2 (`-ratio test for ρ = 0) 337.93 252.84
Marginal eﬀects reported for bivariate probit estimations. Robust z statistics in brackets,
standard errors control for cluster design; signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗ : 1%; ∗ : 5%; † : 10%.
Extreme values are dropped from the sample.
Note: Income and its squared value in speciﬁcations of tables (5) (upper part) and (6)
(lower part) is replaced by parents’ educational attainment and only these marginal eﬀects
are reported.
competition between labor and school can be detected in two forms. For ob-
servable factors we obtain the direction of the eﬀect a particular variable has
on labor and school attendance. The factors are substituting if the signs of
the estimation coeﬃcients are adverse, and complementing if they are equal.
A particular factor of the former kind does not beneﬁt (or e.g. positively af-
fect) both activities but leads to one activity driving out the other—that is,
one is a substitute for the other—, a factor of the latter kind has the same
eﬀect on both labor and school. This approach is very similar to the one
chosen by Akabayashi and Psacharopoulos (1999, pp. 133ﬀ) in their study
on the trade-oﬀ between work and study time at home.
Our results in tables 5 and 6 give various examples for substituting and
complementing factors: Whether or not a girl or boy lives in an urban
household has a strong substituting eﬀect on the labor-schooling decision,
23whereas the gender of the child is a complementing factor when consider-
ing rural and urban households separately. We also observe factors that
have diﬀerent eﬀect patterns for diﬀerent sub-amples. The child’s age, for
instance, is complementing in rural but substituting in urban households.27
The older children in urban areas get the more they are able to specialize,
while their fellows in rural households experience a higher rate of combining
labor with school attendance; their probability of work increases at the same
time, however, they are more likely to work.
As aforementioned, the household structure is an important factor in the
determination of labor participation and school attendance rates. Both the
number of infant siblings and the number of adults have a substituting eﬀect,
though of opposite directions, for urban households only. Only the girls’
sub-sample shows a similar pattern for the number of adults. Table 7 gives
strong evidence for the substituting nature of parents’ education which has a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on education in all sub-samples, the most consistent
result for all variables we expected to capture the schooling cost constraint
and indiﬀerence, as indicated in table 3 and the discussion thereafter.
Of greater interest than the substituting or complementing nature of the
used explanatory variables, however, is the unexplained correlation between
labor and school which is denoted by the coeﬃcient ρ. Roughly speaking,
ρ gives the extent to which school attendance increases—unobservably—if
labor decreases. After all explanatory variables are controlled for, what is
left is then a non-explainable degree of interdependence of the two decisions,
driven by unobservable factors. Such unobserved household characteristics
for example may be the perceived improvement of income opportunities in
case of children’s school attendance (rather than the statistical return on
education); perceived availability of schooling relative to the ease or urge of
sending children into the labor force; or simply the parents’ utter wish or
desire to send their children to school, an eﬀect which may not be captured
by any of the used variables. Lopez-Calva (2003) further considers social
norms and social stigma costs in addition to the usual “children-as-assets
type analysis.”
These partially intrinsic factors give rise what I refer to as unobserable
27Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) report results for their sample of Ghanaian chil-
dren that support the ﬁndings for urban Uganda; they report a higher trade-oﬀ coeﬃcient
ρ for older children. See table 9 and discussion below.
24Table 8: ρ for vicinity and gender sub-samples
Sub-sample ρ χ
2 N
full -0.6252 489.66 19,299
rural -0.6205 381.42 15,642
urban -0.7758 129.61 3,657
girls -0.7117 349.65 9,499
boys -0.5961 261.94 9,800
rural girls -0.6926 281.28 7,649
urban girls -0.8984 73.98 1,850
rural boys -0.5630 205.82 7,993
urban boys -0.8028 63.64 1,807
a: χ2 for the likelihood-ratio test of ρ = 0.
Note: Coeﬃcient ρ, χ2 and the number of
observations N are reported for the various
vicinity and gender sub-samples, based on the
speciﬁcation of table (5).
or “intrinsic competition”: the labor-school trade-oﬀ beyond what can be
explained by the explanatory variables in our econometric setting.28
The “competition coeﬃcient” ρ for the full sample as well as the gen-
der and vicinity sub-samples is given in table 8. The main results are a
higher trade-oﬀ in urban than in rural households and for girls than for
boys. Hence, rural boys experience the least intrinsic competition in their
parents’ decisions. That means, for them work and school attendance are
least incompatible with each other after all observable factors have been con-
trolled for. On the other hand, girls in urban households face an “either/or”
decision; if they are to increase their labor force participation in response
to factors other than the observed, their school attendance rates drop more
than those of boys.29
Two observations are noticeable: The results in table 8 very closely relate
to the ﬁgures in column 6 of table 2. Urban girls have the lowest labor-school
combination rate, rural boys the highest. It is of no surprise, though, to
obtain the least intrinsic competition coeﬃcient for the sub-sample with the
highest combination rate. Nonetheless, for girls the two choices are more
(mutually) exclusive than for boys, indeed suggesting a school–jeopardizing
28An important side remark: This study does not intend to reveal a causal relationship
between labor and schooling, that means the results allow no conclusion with respect to
whether labor hampers school or school draws children out of the labor force. The results
discussed hereafter are simply an account of the correlation due to unobserved factors.
29The coeﬃcients obtained in table 7—parents’ education was used as explanatory vari-
ables in lieu of non child labor household income—do not substantially diﬀer from the
initial results that are given in table 8.
25nature of child labor. Similar is true for urban households where children
tend to be less able to combine labor and schooling. A clear diﬀerence in
trade-oﬀs across sub–samples is given.
What is of greater interest, though, is the close correspondence of the
obtained results with table 3. The correlation coeﬃcients roughly repro-
duce the pattern given by costs as reason for never attending school. The
sub-samples exhibiting the highest rates of costs as reason also yield the
strongest competition factors. It seems that the obtained results are driven
by perceived costs of schooling. Even after controlling for income, wealth,
or the number of siblings (aﬀecting relative costs of schooling) there is still
a considerable portion of the trade-oﬀ that is unexplained but seems to be
cost-related. There is thus a need for further research in this direction in or-
der to identify the nature of these costs and their properties as labor-school
determinants. The observed correspondence of ρ with costs exempliﬁes the
need to understand the driving forces behind the proclaimed “intrinsic com-
petition” to fully understand the labor-school decision. Only then will we
be able to discuss policy measures that alleviate households’ costs constraint
and decrease “bad” child labor while at the same time increase school at-
tendance and performance.
In order to get a glimpse of where this study is to be seen within the
literature, table 9 collects the correlation coeﬃcients as obtained by recent
studies using data from three continents and various years. The coeﬃ-
cients range from zero (Bacolod and Ranjan 2005) to close to negative unity
(Kambhampati and Rajan 2004) and give very ambiguous results. Except
for Nielsen (1998) and Kambhampati and Rajan (2004) (and Lopez-Acevedo
(2002) for the vicinity sub-samples) the authors obtain a low trade-oﬀ for
the full samples, which is not consistent with the ﬁndings in this study. More
meaningful than the absolute ﬁgures, however, are the diﬀerence across the
sub-samples. The results of Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) for instance
exhibit a pattern that is similar to our results for Uganda when considering
the stronger trade-oﬀ for urban than for rural households. They do, however,
not get a stronger trade-oﬀ for girls as this study suggests. Furthermore,
the results of Nkamleu (2004), Kambhampati and Rajan (2004) and Parikh
and Sadoulet (2005) are of noticeable similarity.
Through table 9 it becomes clear that there are no unambiguous cross-
country results on “instrinsic competition” for speciﬁc sub-samples of the
26Table 9: Coeﬃcient ρ in recent studies for various sub-samples
Country Year Age full rural urban girls boys
Cote d’Ivoire
a 2002 6–14 -0.167 -0.195 -0.141
Ghana




c 1987–92 7–14 -0.1527 -0.1228 -0.3080 -0.1140 -0.1473
Zambia
d 1993 7–14 -0.63 -0.65 -0.44 -0.64 -0.62
Zambia
e 1993 7–14 -0.78 -0.40
India (rural)
f 1987–89 5–15 -0.46 -0.43
India (rural)
g 1987–89 5–15 -0.44 -0.39
India




j 1992 10–14 -0.227 -0.311
Brazil
k 1996 10–14 -0.1794 -0.2079
Brazil
l 1996 10–14 -0.2471 -0.2425
Brazil
m 1998 5–15 -0.1582
Brazil
n 1998 5–15 -0.2554
Brazil
o 1998 5–15 -0.0363
Ecuador
p 1998 10–14 -0.572 -0.526
15–17 -0.484 -0.441
Mexico
q 1994–98 12–16 -0.4154
The table gives the coeﬃcient ρ as obtained by recent studies; for the full sample, as well as
rural, urban and girls and boys sub-sample. Non-zero coeﬃcients are listed if signiﬁcant or
if signiﬁcance levels are not reported in the respective studies.
a: Nkamleu (2004); b: Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and cincluding school expen-
ditures; d: Nielsen (1998) and ewith random eﬀects; f: Pal (2003) with parents’ labor
participation rates and gwith wage rates; h: Kambhampati and Rajan (2004); i: Bacolod
and Ranjan (2005); j: Parikh and Sadoulet (2005); k: Emerson and Portela (2001) with
positive hours at work and lwith at least 20 hours; m: Muniz (2001), nwith waged work and
owith non-waged work; p: Lopez-Acevedo (2002); q: Lopez-Calva (2003).
population. It is rather the case that results to a great extent hinge on the
choice of explanatory variables. The research objective for this study was
to identify the trade-oﬀ for Uganda, how and how much one can speak of
a pattern that is observable across countries and continents is up to future
research.
6 Conclusion
This paper jointly estimates a household’s child labor and child school at-
tendance decision applying a bivariate probit model to recent household
data from Uganda that has not been used before in this particular research
context. Individual characteristics, household’s income and asset variables,
variables denoting household composition and number of siblings as well as
27district and monthly control variables were used as regressors in this two-
equation system and their marginal eﬀects on each of the decisions as well
as the correlation coeﬃcient ρ reported. Three central questions have been
looked at in more detail:
First, the issue of child labor has become a vivid ﬁeld in economic re-
search. Part of this is motivated by the argument that labor deprives chil-
dren of their childhood and jeopardizes both their school attendance and per-
formance. This is said to have both private and social costs: Lack of educa-
tion would not allow children to escape from the poverty trap, and impaired
accumulation of human capital would eventually lead to worse prospects of
a society’s economic growth. This empirical study shows that there is in
fact “competition” between labor force participation and school attendance,
however, for Uganda this trade-oﬀ is less severe than suggested by authors
who have assumed mutual exclusiveness of the two choices (e.g. Jensen and
Nielsen (1997)) or than shown in other empirical studies (e.g. Canagarajah
and Coulombe (1997)). Especially boys and children in rural households
are able to combine their labor activities with school attendance. No con-
clusions, however, can be drawn with respect to any common cross-country
results, nor is there anything to be said about eﬀects on the quality of chil-
dren’s school attendance. The observation that boys tend to combine both
activities while girls specialize gives rise to a possible structural gender spe-
ciﬁc diﬀerence in school performance if child labor indeed aﬀects the quality
of education.
Second, determining the eﬀects of wage income and income from self–
employment as well as households’ property positions has been an extensive
ﬁeld of empirical literature. Central to this work is the notion of the poverty
hypothesis of child labor, suggesting that poverty drives children into labor
and out of school. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) have recently used the term
“wealth paradox” to describe the initially paradoxical observation of a higher
incidence of child labor in households that are rich in land and other agricul-
tural assets, shedding new light on the poverty explanation. The results for
Uganda give partially supportive results with respect to the “wealth para-
dox”, but do not strongly support the traditional poverty notion: Income
does neither aﬀect girls’ decisions nor is it relevant in urban households. It
has a signiﬁcant impact on boys’ decisions, though, suggesting some degree
of “gender attitude.” Boys’ schooling and labor reacts more sensitively to in-
28come, that means a larger portion of available additional income is denoted
to them.
This ﬁnally leads to the third conclusion of this paper. There are sub-
stantial diﬀerences in child labor and school attendance across the used
sub–samples. With respect to gender, a strong bias is observed: Girls are
less likely to combine labor with school attendance whereas the chance to
attend school while working is indeed given to boys. Though girls have a
lower probability of labor, this result is due to the fact that they are ex-
tensively involved in intra-household activities. Further, parents are more
cost-sensitive with respect to girls’ school attendance, rather withdrawing
them than their brothers. One explanation for this is their involvement in
chores or household–near activities, as is suggested by the negative eﬀect
of infant siblings on school attendance—in general, their sensitivity with
respect to household composition and number of younger siblings. Further
empirical research is necessary to shed more light on the role of gender and
its interrelation with income and property.
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